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The Legality of Armed Drone Strikes against U.S. 
Citizens within the United States 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The passage of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2012 drew heated criticism from both sides of the political 
spectrum 1 because it hinted that the U.S. military could, if necessary, 
detain a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil in accordance with the laws of 
armed conflict instead of through the criminal justice system.2 A 
number of commentators and politicians assert that this would 
violate the fundamental constitutional rights that Americans enjoy.3 
The idea that the United States could use military force according to 
the laws of armed conflict within the United States, however, 
appears to be consistent with American history, 4 the text of the 
Constitution, 5 and Supreme Court precedent. 6 In a similar way, the 
U.S. military's targeted killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi, a U.S. citizen 
living in Yemen, in 2011 was highly controversial and raised 
questions about whether the United States could lawfully use 
1. See, e.g., NOAA, ACLU BLOc Rls. (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.aclu.org/blog/tag 
/ndaa; Sunana Batra, NDAA Passage Perfect Way to Sully Bill of Rights Anniversary with a Black Eye, 
FREEREPUBLJC.COM (Dec. 16, 2011 ), http:/ /www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/2827817 
/posts. 
2. S. 1867, !12th Cong. § 1032(a) (b)(J) (2011). The text of the bill merely states that 
the requirement to detain al-Qacda members does not extend to U.S. citizens. The implication is 
that military detention according to the law of armed conOict is an option that the President may 
exercise according to his or her discretion. 
3. See Robert Gehrke, Utah Lawmakers Sound Off Against Federal Detention Bill, SALT LAKE 
TR lB. (Feb. 27, 20 12). http:/ /www.sltrib.com/sl trib/poli tics/53598367 -90/utah-federal-act-
bill.html.csp; Kurt Nimmo, Ron Paul Introduces Legislation to Strike NOAA's Unconstitutional Section 
1021, INFOWARS.COM Qan. 18, 2012), http://www.infowars.com/ron-paul-introduces-legislation-
to-strike-ndaas-unconstitutional-section- l 021. 
4. See, e.g., Warren W. Hassler, Jr., American Civil War, BRITTANICA.COM, 
http://w ww.brirannica.com/EBchecked/topic/19407 /American-Civil-War (noting that the U.S. 
government used military force within the borders of the United States and against U.S. 
citizens). 
5. See U.S. CoNST. amend. Ill (foreseeing that the federal government may need to use 
military force within the United States and proscribing how troops might be quartered in civilian 
homes). 
6. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
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military force against its own citizens. 7 As one commentator 
observed, however, "[n]o laws, international or domestic, prohibit 
the practice if it is carried out by a state against an enemy of that 
state actively engaged in an armed conflict against that state."8 
Despite the fact that the laws of armed conflict have applied to 
the use of military force within the borders of the United States and 
to U.S. citizens in the past, many Americans have argued that it is a 
gross violation of their rights. 9 It raises the question: What other 
aspects of military force would be permissible within the United 
States and against its citizens under the laws of armed conflict that 
run contrary to current popular assumptions? To explore this issue, 
this Comment poses the intentionally provocative question: Could 
the U.S. military conduct an armed drone strike against a U.S. citizen 
within the United States? The answer is most likely yes, but only 
under a narrow set of circumstances. 
The use of unmanned armed aerial drones to target individuals 
during armed conflict is one of the most controversial U.S. practices 
in the War on Terror. 10 Recent years, however, have only seen an 
increase in the number of armed drone attacks overseas, 11 and the 
United States continues to defend its lawfulness. 12 If the use of 
armed drone strikes is acceptable under the laws of armed conflict, 
and the laws of armed conflict apply to the use of military force 
within the United States, then the U.S. military could conceivably 
target a U.S. citizen in the United States using an armed drone. The 
following is a hypothetical scenario that will be referred to 
throughout this Comment. 
7. See Glenn Greenwald, The Due-Process-Free Assassination of US Citizens Is Now Reality, 
SALON.COM (Sep. 30, 2011), http://www.salon.com/2011/09/30/awlaki_6/singleton. 
8. Mike Dreyfuss, My Fellow Americans, We Are Going to Kill You: The Legality of Targeting and 
Killing U.S. Citizens Abroad, 65 VAND. L. REV. 249, 291 (2012). 
9. See Gehrke, supra note 3; Greenwald, supra note 7. 
I 0. See Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and 
the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks irt Pakistan, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L REV. 77, 126 (2010); 
Akbar Nasir Khan, Legality of Targeted Killings by Drone Attacks in Pakistan, PAK. lNST. PEACE STUD. 
(20 11), available at http:/ /www.san-pips.com/download. php?f= 76. pdf. 
11. Predator Drones and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), N.Y. TIMES, http:/ /topics 
.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/ subjects/u/unmanned _aerial_ vehicl es/i ndex.html (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2012). 
12. Kenneth Anderson, Harold Koh Statements on Drone Warfare at ASIL Tonight, VOLOKH 
CoNSPIRACY (Mar. 25, 2010), http://volokh.com/2010/03/25/harold-koh-state ments-on-drone-
warfare-at-asil-tonight. 
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A. Scenario for an Armed Drone Strike within the United States 
Consider the following hypothetical: 
The U.S. military has recently captured ai-Qaeda operatives in 
Afghanistan who, when interrogated, provided consistent accounts 
of a plan to remotely detonate chemical weapons in the Alamo and 
at least two more unknown locations in or around San Antonio, 
Texas. The attack is supposed to happen within the next few days, 
but no one knows exactly when. Initial estimates place the civilian 
death toll at about 1,000 people. According to the detainees, the ai-
Qaeda members planning the attack live in a suburban 
neighborhood just outside of San Antonio. Two ai-Qaeda members 
along with their families live in the house, which acts as the 
operations center for the attack. All are U.S. citizens. In preparation 
for the attack, the ai-Qaeda members have stockpiled small arms, 
ammunition, chemical weapons, and even some larger anti-tank 
weapons as well as remote detonating equipment. Within hours, 
law enforcement officials have identified the house in question and 
have observed individuals coming and going consistent with the 
human intelligence. Two persons have been identified as known ai-
Qaeda operatives. Civilian law enforcement agents have made no 
attempt to intercept or apprehend the persons out of fear that doing 
so would prompt them to remotely trigger the chemical weapons, 
which have yet to be located. Civilian law enforcement is also 
unequipped to deal with chemical weapons and anti-tank weapons. 
The President of the United States conducts a thorough review of 
the evidence and determines that the ai-Qaeda members pose an 
imminent threat of violence and that capture is not possible. 
Invoking the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, the 
President orders a series of armed drone strikes on the house 
designed to kill the targets before they have a chance to remotely 
detonate the chemical weapons. Within hours the house has been 
completely destroyed and everyone inside has been killed. Later, an 
investigation finds that the strikes killed two known ai-Qaeda 
operatives as well as seven family members and ten neighbors. 
While admittedly disturbing, this scenario is likely legal under 
current domestic laws and lawful under the laws of armed conflict. 
This Comment deals primarily with lex lata, the law as it currently 
stands and does not define what the law should be. In Part II, this 
Comment examines why military force has been and continues to be 
justified and regulated under the laws of armed conflict within the 
territory of the United States. Part III deals with the lawfulness of 
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targeting U.S. citizens during armed conflict. Part IV ultimately 
concludes that it is currently legal to use armed drones within the 
United States to target U.S. citizens. 
II. THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT APPLY WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
A quick review of the history of American armed conflict reveals 
a striking trend that may be influencing popular conceptions on the 
use of military force within the United States. The last major armed 
conflict against a foreign nation fought on U.S. soil was the War of 
1812, in which the British sacked and burned the White House. 13 
This was followed by the Civil War from 1861 to 1865, which was 
the last time a major war occurred on U.S. soil. 14 Various wars 
against American Indian tribes lasted until the late 1800s. 15 Since 
then, all armed conflicts in which the United States has been 
involved have occurred extraterritorially. 16 While two devastating 
attacks-Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, 2001-occurred within the territory of the United 
States, the ensuing armed conflicts occurred on foreign soil. 17 The 
result is the creation of an American tradition that armed conflict is 
something that happens overseas, not at home. The applicability of 
the laws of armed conflict within the United States, however, has 
not changed. Absent this century-old tradition of exclusively 
extraterritorial armed conflict, it might be completely 
uncontroversial for the government to use military force against 
enemy combatants within its own borders. For Americans today, 
however, this raises legitimate concerns about the balance between 
national security and constitutionally guaranteed rights. It is 
13. David S. Heidler & Jeanne T. Heidler, War of 1812, BRITANNICA.COM, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/181068/War-of-1812 (last visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
14. Hassler, supra note 4. 
15. See ELLIOT WEST, THE LAST INDIAN WAR: THE NEZ PERCE STORY XV (2009) (arguing 
that the last major American Indian war was against the Nez Perce and ended in 1877). 
16. See American History Timeline: American Involvement in Wars from Colonial Times to the 
Present, AMERICANHISTOR Y.ABOUT. COM, http:/ I americanhi story. abou t.com/li brary /timelines/ 
bltimelineuswars.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
17. See Pearl Harbor Attack, BRIT ANNICA.COM, http:/ /www.britannica.com/Ebchecked 
/topic/448010/Pearl-Harbor-attack (last visited Nov. 19, 2012); Peter L. Bergen, September 11 
Attacks, BRITANNICA.C:OM, http://www. britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/762320/Scptcmber-11-
attacks (last visited Nov. 19, 2012). 
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therefore worthwhile to review how the law of armed conflict applies 
under certain circumstances within the United States. 
The text of the Constitution, American history, and Supreme 
Court precedent all indicate that, if necessary, the United States 
could fight an armed conflict on U.S. soil and even against U.S. 
citizens in accordance with the laws of armed conflict. This applies 
to the current Global War on Terror as authorized by Congress in 
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) .18 
A. Historical View of the Law of Armed Conflict in the United States 
A review of the text of the Constitution shows that armed 
conflict within the United States was one of the major subjects that 
concerned the Framers. One of the stated purposes in the preamble 
of the Constitution is to "provide for the common defense." 19 Article 
I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to declare war, raise an army, 
maintain a navy, and define and punish violations of the law of 
nations.20 Article II, Section 2 sets up the executive as the 
commander and chief of the army and navy.21 While not often 
recognized as a "war power," Article III, Section 3 gives the Judiciary 
power to try U.S. citizens who are "levying War" against the United 
States for treason. 22 It also ~ives power to Congress to determine the 
punishment for treason. 3 Furthermore, the Bill of Rights 
contemplated the use of military force and the application of the 
laws of armed conflict within the United States. The Third 
Amendment specifically allows troops to be quartered in private 
homes in times of war in a manner prescribed by law. 24 While the 
case of al-Aulaqi, in which a U.S. citizen adheres to an enemy group 
like al-Qaeda, is relatively surprising and rare in modern times, 25 in 
18. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001). 
19. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
20. !d. at an. I, § 8, cis. 11-13. 
21. !d. at art. II, § 2. 
22. I d. at art. Ill, § 3. 
23. Id. 
24. /d. at amend. III. 
25. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 24 (1945) (discussing the rarity of U.S. 
citizens taking up arms against their country). But see Abu Mansur AI Amriki, U.S. jihadi in 
Somalia, Reportedly Claims Comrades Want to Kill Him, HUFF!NGTONPOST.COM (Mar. 17, 2012), 
http:/ /www.huflingtonposl.com/20 12/03/17 /abu-mansur-al-amriki-video _ n _1355387.html 
(showing that ai-Aulaqi is not unique in being a U.S. citizen who has joined a terrorist group). 
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1789 the Framers were keenly aware of the possibility that U.S. 
citizens mi~ht engage in armed conflict with the federal 
government. 6 Dealing with a treason case in 1945, the Supreme 
Court observed the following about the Framers: 
When our forefathers took up the task of forming an independent 
political organization for New World society, no one of them 
appears to have doubted that to bring into being a new government 
would originate a new allegiance for its citizens and inhabitants. 
Nor were they reluctant to punish as treason any genuine breach of 
allegiance, as every government time out of mind had done. The 
betrayal of Washington by Arnold was fresh in mind. They were far 
more awake to powerful enemies with designs on this continent 
than some of the intervening generations have been .27 
A little less than four-score years later, the Civil War provided 
perhaps the most devastating example of the federal government's 
use of military force against U.S. citizens within U.S. territory. The 
Union Army killed about 75,000 U.S. citizens who were fighting for 
the Confederacy during that armed conflict.28 In Ex Parte Milligan, a 
military detention case arising after the Civil War, both sides to the 
controversy recognized that the laws of armed conflict as applied 
during the Civil War were "accepted as part of the law of nations, 
and extended . . . to all belligerents."29 
Even after the Civil War, when the U.S. transitioned into the 
current era of exclusively extraterritorial armed conflict, military 
force and military tribunals were used against U.S. citizens. During 
the Second World War, for example, a number of U.S. citizens chose 
to fight for Nazi Germany against the Allies and the United States. 30 
26. Cramer, 325 U.S. at 8. 
27. Td. 
28. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY 849 Qohn W. Chambers Il 
ed., Oxford University Press 1999). 
29. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 36 (1866). The Court in Milligan eventually found that 
military tribunals after a conflict were not acceptable for U.S. citizens when federal courts were 
operational in that same jurisdiction. Td. at 127. While this has implications for the NOAA of 
2012, it does not touch the question of whether the U.S. government could use an armed drone 
strike against a U.S. citizen within the United States. 
30. Shaun Downey, Americans in the SS, PooR MOUTH BLOG Qune 10, 2006), 
http://thepoormouth.blogspot.com/2006/06/americans-in-ss.html; Gary Warth, Columnist 
Recounts Tale of German-Americans Fighting for Nazis, ]OURNALSTAR.COM Quly 8, 2006, 7:00 PM) 
http:/ /journalstar.com/lifestyles/article _ 66492ff6-2d6c-5bf0-a 1 a4-499 7 e5b9d5 78 .html. 
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On the battlefields in Europe, the U.S. military treated these U.S. 
citizens according to the laws of armed conflict and not according to 
U.S. criminal law.31 While no battles during the Second World War 
were fought on U.S. soil, the same rules applied to U.S. citizens who 
took up arms against the United States.32 
The case of Herbert Hans Haupt is illustrative of this point. 
Haupt was a U.S. citizen who had lived in the United States since he 
was five years old, but left to fight for Germany during the Second 
World War.33 Along with a handful of fluent English speakers in the 
German military, he clandestinely returned to the United States via 
submarine to sabotage U.S. military operations and to engage in 
what might now be referred to as terrorism.34 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation arrested Haupt and his fellow would-be saboteurs and 
turned them over to a military tribunal to be tried according to the 
laws of armed conflict, not U.S. domestic criminal law.35 The 
military tribunal found Haupt guilty of violating the laws of war. 36 In 
Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court affirmed the military tribunal's 
jurisdiction. 37 It further held that the laws of armed conflict 
governed the way the U.S. military deals with an enemy belligerent 
regardless of his status as a U.S. citizen.38 "Citizens who associate 
themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and 
with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on 
3 I. See Oregonian Editorial Bd., Sixty-five Years After Operation Overlord, OREGONL!VE.COM 
Qune 5, 2009), http:/ /www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2009/06/sixtyfive_years_ 
after_operatio.html. Don Malarkey, a World War Two veteran, made famous in the book and 
television series Band of Brothers, recounts meeting a German prisoner of war who was 
originally from Portland, Oregon. The prisoner was treated the same way as the other prisoners 
of war. 
32. See infra note 38. 
33. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 20 (1942), modified, U.S.exrel. Quirin v. Cox, 63 S. Ct. 22 
(I 942). 
34. See id. at 21. 
35. Id. at 21, 23. 
36. LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 206-07 (2d ed. 2004). 
37. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48. 
38. Id. at 37. President Roosevelt's decision to try Haupt in a military tribunal was 
controversial, and subsequent cases arising out of the same facts resulted in Art. III § 3 treason 
trials in civilian courts. FISHER, supra note 36, at 205-08; see also Cramer v. United States, 325 
U.S. 1 (1945). However, the fact that President Roosevelt decided to change the way he 
prosecuted an armed conflict only shows that a president may exercise discretion in applying the 
laws of armed conflict instead of criminal law. The Supreme Court precedent in Quirin and 
Cramer show that either is acceptable as a matter of law. 
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hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . . . the 
law ofwar."39 Haupt was executed on August 8, 1942.40 
B. The Laws of Armed Conflict Applied During the War on Terror 
The question of how the laws of armed conflict apply to U.S. 
citizens during times of war has arisen most recently during the 
Global War on Terror. 41 With congressional authorization, the 
President may use military force against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil 
when that person is taking active part in an armed conflict against 
the United States. This would apply generally to anyone actively 
participating in the Global War on Terror. 
Before discussing how the laws of armed conflict apply in these 
instances, however, it is necessary to discuss whether the United 
States is currently in a state of armed conflict or war.42 Following the 
attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Authorization 
for the Use of Military Force (AUMF), allowing the President to use 
all necessary means against those responsible for the attacks. 43 
While there is no statutory formula for declaring that the United 
States is in a state of war, declarations of war have traditionally 
consisted of two parts: first, an official declaration that a state of war 
exists between two states; and second, an authorization for the 
President to use all necessary military force. 44 
39. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 3 7, 38. 
40. 8 August 1942 - Herbert Hans Haupt, EXECUTION DAY, http:/ /eotd. word press. com 
/2008/08/08/8-august-1942-herbert-hans-haupt/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
41. See supra notes 1-3. 
42. See Gabor Rona, U.S. Targeted Killing Policy Unjustified, jURIST.ORG (Feb. 24, 2012), 
http://jurist.org/hotline/2012/02/gabor-rona-targeted-killing.php (arguing that the War on 
Terror is substantively different than an international armed conflict like the Second World 
War). 
43. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
44. See An Act Declaring War Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the 
Dependencies Thereof and the United States of America and Their Territories, AVALON PROJECT YALE L. 
ScH., http:/ /avalon.law.yale.edu/19th _ century/1812-0l.asp (last visited on Nov. 19, 2012) 
(declaration for the War of 1812); President McKinley and the Declaration of War, SPANISH AMERICAN 
WAR CENTENNIAL WEBSITE, http:/ /www.spanamwar.com/ McKinleywardec.htm (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2012) (declaration for the Spanish American War); Text of the Declaration of War Against 
Germany World War I, NATIONALCENTER.ORG, http://www.nationalcentcr.org/DeclarationofWWI.html 
(last visited Nov. 19, 20 12) (declaration for World War I); Declarations of a State of War with japan, 
Germany, and Italy: Part 10, AVALON PROJECT YALE L. SCH., 
http:/ /avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/declO.asp (declaration for the Second World War) (last visited 
Nov. 19, 2012). 
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The AUMF is similar to a declaration of war in that it authorizes 
the President 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in 
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against 
the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.45 
The AUMF also specifically invokes congressional war powers.46 
The AUMF, however, is unlike past declarations of war in that it 
fails to explicitly describe a state of war. The magic words 
"declaration of war" are probably no longer necessary or appropriate, 
however, since a new regime of international law was ushered in 
after the Second World WarY The United Nations Charter generally 
outlawed war and triggered the demise of the word "war" as a "legal 
term of art."48 
Accordingly, the War Powers Resolution specifically allows the 
executive to invoke war powers without an overt declaration of war 
as long as there is specific statutory authorization from Congress.49 
Furthermore, the U.S. Army maintains that a formal declaration of 
war is not essential to trigger the laws of armed conflict. 50 The 
Korean War, for instance, was an international armed conflict 
authorized by the U.N. Security Council51 without a declaration of 
war. 52 President Harry Truman agreed that the Korean War was a 
"police action under the United Nations."53 According to Article 51 
of the U.N. Charter, states also have an inherent right to use force in 
45. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
46. Jd. 
47. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 7-8 (2nd ed. 
2009). 
48. Jd. 
49. so u.s.c. § 1541 (2012). 
50. Department of the Army Field Manual27-10, ch. 1, § 1 (1956). 
51. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/1511 Qune 27, 1950). 
52. Allan R. Millett, Korean War, BRITANNICA.COM, http:/ /www.britannica.com 
/EBchecked/topic/322419/Korean-War (last visited Sept. 27, 2012). 
53. The President's News Conference of june 29, 1950, TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG, 
http:/ /Leachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=594 (last visited Sept. 27, 
2012). 
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self-defense when they have been the object of an armed attack.54 
Under the new paradigm, it is no longer necessary or even 
appropriate to declare war when all that is required is to invoke the 
right of self-defense or U.N. Security Council authorization. The 
AUMF explicitly invoked the right of self-defense, 55 and the U.N. 
Security Council recognized the ri~ht of self-defense immediately 
following the September 11 attacks. 6 
The fact that the AUMF legally triggered the laws of armed 
conflict is reinforced by the Supreme Court's ruling in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld that Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions 
applies to the Global War on Terror. 57 Common Article Three deals 
solely with armed conflicts. 58 Taking all this into consideration, the 
AUMF, while not without serious flaws, is a sufficient declaration of 
war or armed conflict to trigger the laws of armed conflict. 
For the most part, the laws of armed conflict have applied today 
in the same way they did during the Second World War. While the 
War on Terror raises tough questions in international law, 59 the 
Supreme Court has made it clear from a domestic perspective that 
the War on Terror is an armed conflict governed by Common Article 
Three of the Geneva Conventions. 60 According to its text, Common 
Article Three applies to "armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties .... "61 The hypothetical scenario Comment outlined in 
Section II of this Comment occurs within the territory of the United 
States, which is a high contracting party to the Geneva 
Conventions. 62 Viewed in its proper context, Common Article Three 
54. U.N. Charter art. 51. 
55. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
56. S.C. Res. 1386, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
57. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629 (2006). 
58. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
59. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Er.hancing the Status of Non-State Actors Through a Global War 
on Terror?, 43 COLUM. ]. TRANSNAT'L L. 435 (2005) (describing the difficulties of claiming self-
defense against a non-state actor like Al-Qaeda). 
60. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629. 
61. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
62. See ICRC, State Parties to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related 
Treaties, lNT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Aug. 23, 2012), available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
IHL.nsf/%28SPFo/o29/party _main_ treaties/$File/IHL _ and_ other _related_ Treaties. pdf. 
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consists of two parts-one explicit and one implicit. The explicit part 
of Common Article Three describes a minimum amount of 
protections that must be afforded to "[p] ersons taking no active part 
in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid 
down their arms and those placed hors de combat .... "63 The 
implicit part of Common Article Three is that persons who are 
actively taking part in hostilities and are not hors de combat can be 
targeted and killed according to the customary laws of armed 
conflict. This clear authority to target U.S. citizens who are taking 
active part in hostilities against the United States must be balanced, 
however, with constitutional guarantees that proscribe what actions 
the government can take against an individual. 64 
The Supreme Court struggled to strike that balance in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld in 2004. 65 Most of the analysis in Hamdi deals with the 
question of detention, which, inter alia, does not affect the legality of 
the scenario presented in this Comment.66 The plurality in Hamdi 
did, however, reaffirm the general principle in Ex parte Quirin that a 
person may be considered an enemy combatant according to the laws 
of armed conflict regardless of citizenship, holding: "There is no bar 
to this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy 
combatant. "67 
Based on the Constitution, U.S. history, and Supreme Court 
precedent, it is clear that the President, when authorized by 
Congress, may use military force against a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil 
when that person is taking active part in an armed conflict against 
the United States. Such a use of force is governed by the laws of 
armed conflict and not by domestic criminal law. Furthermore, the 
AUMF has triggered the laws of armed conflict and is an adequate 
grant of power to the executive branch to prosecute a war against 
terror anywhere in the world, including the United States. This 
63. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 61, at 
136. 
64. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528 (2004). 
65. See id. 
66. See id. 
67. Td. at 519. 
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authorization, however, is not unlimited. 68 Several checks exist on 
the use of military force within the United States. 
III. RESTRICTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE WITHIN THE U.S. AND 
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS 
The major restrictions on the use of military force within the 
United States and against U.S. citizens are due process rights, the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, Executive 
Order 12333, and the Posse Comitatus Act. 
The plurality in Hamdi dealt primarily with the issue of due 
process rights as contained in the Fifth Amendment.69 It held that 
even though U.S. citizens may lawfully be classified as enemy 
combatants, they are due some form of process before they are 
deprived of life or liberty?0 "[W] ar is not a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens." 71 It 
is only logical that if due process limitations apply to detention 
during armed conflict then similar limitations would also apply to 
targeting during armed conflict. 72 The Hamdi plurality used the 
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, which requires the private 
interest of the individual be weighed against the government's 
interest to determine if the risk of potential error stemming from 
reduced process outweighs the overall benefits to the government.73 
Applied to the facts in Hamdi, the plurality found that Hamdi 
could not be accorded the full array of due process rights that a 
defendant in a criminal trial might receive, but the Constitution 
requires that he at least be able to challenge his status as an enemy 
68. Jeh Charles johnson, Gen. Counsel Dept. of Def., Dean's Lecture at Yale Law School: 
National Security Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration, LAWFARE (Feb. 22, 2012), 
http:/ /www.lawfareblog.com/20 12/02/jeh-johnson -speech-at -yale-law-school. 
69. See I-Iamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
70. I d. at 535. 
71. Id. at 536. 
72. It is important to note, however, that in his dissent in Hamdi, justice Souter argues 
that the AUMF does not allow for detention, but that it does allow for the use of military force 
against individuals. The AUMF "is fairly read to authorize the use of armies and weapons, 
whether against other armies or individual terrorists." !d. at 547 (Souter,]., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). If this is followed, targeting would actually 
be less scrutinized than detention. 
73. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
164 
153 The Legality of Armed Drone Strikes 
combatant. 74 Specifically, Hamdi "must receive notice of the factual 
basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the 
government's factual assertions before a neutral decision maker."75 
The executive and legislative branches, therefore, are restricted to 
some degree by the individual due process rights of accused enemy 
combatants, although it is not clear in the scenario in this Comment 
exactly what those would look like. 
Next, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) is a human rights treaty that could theoretically limit the 
U.S. government's use of military force against its own citizens. 76 
Among other things, the ICCPR requires that all signatories respect 
the human rights and freedoms of their citizens by not arbitrarily 
depriving them of life. 77 Furthermore, a state may take the life of 
one of its citizens only "pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a 
competent court."78 In many ways, the ICCPR overlaps with the due 
process rights contained in the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, but the language of the treaty is much more explicit. 
So while the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi that some form of process 
was required by the Constitution, 79 the ICCPR requires specific forms 
of process when dealing with the deprivation of life. 80 
While derogation from some parts of the ICCPR is allowed 
during "time[s] of public emergency [that threaten] the life of the 
nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed," Article 
Six, which deals with the right to life, is non-derogable.81 Based 
solely on the text of the ICCPR, it would seem that a competent 
court would have to find a person guilty before the U.S. government 
74. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
75. Id. 
76. See Thomas Nachbar, Is it Legal?: Can the U.S. Legally Kill Citizens Abroad?, VA. L. REV. 
(Mar. 6, 2012), http:/ /www.law.virginia.edu/html/news/2012 _spr/targeted_killing.htm 
(wondering if the ICCPR applies or whether the laws of armed conflict apply to the al-Awlaqi 
targeted killing). 
77. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 1916 U.S.T. 
521, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
78. Id. 
79. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
80. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, Dec. 16, 1966, 1916 U.S.T. 
521,999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
81. I d. at art. 4. 
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could target them. In times of armed conflict, however, the ICCPR 
may often be "superseded by the laws of war."82 
In the end, the possibility that the ICCPR could limit the use of 
military force against U.S. citizens is mostly academic. The Supreme 
Court has held that "although the [ICCPR] does bind the United 
States as a matter of international law, the United States ratified the 
Covenant on the express understanding that it was not self-
executing and so did not itself create obligations enforceable in the 
federal courts."83 In the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 
Congress did enact some parts of the ICCPR prohibiting extrajudicial 
killings, but only as a civil liability after a killing has occurred and 
only against a foreign state official.84 In addition, the U.S. is not a 
party to the International Criminal Court, which is the only currently 
constituted international court that could conceivably hear a 
controversy between a U.S. citizen and the U.S. government. 85 
Therefore, until Congress implements legislation for the specific 
provisions contained in Article Six, or until the United States 
becomes a party to the International Criminal Court, the ICCPR 
creates no binding legal restriction on the President in a scenario like 
the one proposed in this Comment. 
Some have wondered if Executive Order 12333, which prohibits 
assassination, should act as an effective bar against targeting an 
individual combatant. 86 The order states simply, "No person 
employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government 
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination."87 The U.S. 
Army, however, defines assassination generally as a covert murder 
82. Q&A: US Targeted Killings and International Law, HUM. Rrs. WATCH (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www .hrw.org/news/20 11/12/19 I g-us-targeted-killings-and-international-law. 
83. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004). 
84. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992). 
85. Curtis A. Bradley, ASIL Insights: U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal 
Court Treaty, AM. Soc'y INT'L L. (May 2002), http://www.asil.org/insigh 87.cfm#_ednl. It might 
be possible, however, for a third-party state to espouse the cause of a U.S. citizen wbose rights 
under the ICCPR were violated and bring a case against the United States before the 
International Court of Justice, especially if that citizen had dual citizenship with the third-party 
state. It also might be possible to set up an ad hoc tribunal to try the U.S. government for a 
violation of the ICCPR. These scenarios, however, are highly improbable. 
86. See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2011, at Al, available at http:! /www.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/world/middleeast/secret-us-
memo-made-legal-case-to-kill-a-citizen.html? _r= l. 
87. United States Intelligence Activities, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941, 59952 (Dec. 8, 1981). 
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for political reasons, and not as a targeted killing during a time of 
armed conflict or when an individual poses an immediate threat to 
the United States.88 The executive branch, of course, is free to re-
interpret or to rescind an executive order in the course of 
administering the U5. government. 89 Therefore, Executive Order 
12333 does not bar the targeted killings of U.S. citizens within the 
United States or elsewhere. 
The final major limitation on the ability of the U.S. Government 
to use military force within the United States and against U.S. 
citizens is the Posse Comitatus Act, which was enacted after the 
Civil War to keep local civilian law enforcement from using military 
personnel and equipment. 90 It stands for the principle that the 
militar~ should never be used to enforce civil laws in the United 
States. 1 Some courts have looked to see whether the military has 
assumed the role of civilian law enforcement in the way it arrests or 
detains individuals. 92 This, however, is not a concern in the 
hypothetical scenario since using military force is, by definition, not 
the role of civilian law enforcement within the United States. 
Furthermore, the text of the act seems to render it completely 
inapplicable to the War on Terror. It reads: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses 
any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.93 
The AUMF is an act of Congress that authorizes the president to 
use military force without any restriction on geography. 94 The Posse 
Comitatus Act, therefore, would not bar the government from using 
military force within the borders of the United States. Because 
88. W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, ARMY L., 
Dec. 1989, at 4. 
89. See generally CHARLES H. KOCH, ]R., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE§ 7:31 (3d ed. 
2010). 
90. Tom A. Gizzo & TamaS. Monoson, A Call to Arms: The Posse Comitatus Act and the Use of 
the Military in the Struggle Against International Terrorism, IS PACE INT'L L. REV. 149, 153-55 (2003). 
91. ld. 
92. Id. at 166-67. 
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012). 
94. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
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neither the Posse Comitatus Act nor due process are total bars to the 
use of military force within the United States, and because the 
relevant portions of the ICCPR have yet to be executed in U.S. law, it 
is currently legal for the U.S. government to use military force within 
the United States. It is also probably legal to target U.S. citizens. 
IV. TARGETED KILLINGS OF U.S. CITIZENS 
It is unlikely that Anwar al-Aulaqi was surprised when the group 
he was traveling with in Yemen spotted a CIA-operated drone 
carrying a hellfire missile on September 30, 2011. 95 Al-Aulaqi, a U.S. 
citizen who was actively involved with an al-Qaeda affiliate in 
Yemen, had already escaped one U.S. drone attack earlier that year. 96 
By the time the strike occurred, he had been a publicly known target 
of the U.S. military for over a year and a half.97 His father had even 
attempted to intervene on his behalf through the U.S. court system, 
but was denied standing.98 The hellfire missile deployed from the 
drone killed al-Aulaqi, another U.S. citizen who was traveling with 
him, and at least five other people. 99 Two weeks later, another U.S. 
drone strike targeted and killed al-Aulaqi's sixteen-year-old son, 
Abdulrhaman. 100 The series of armed drone strikes on al-Aulaqi and 
his family appears to be the first time that the United States has 
deliberately targeted and killed U.S. citizens in the War on Terror. 101 
95. Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/times 
topics/people/a/anwar _al_awlaki/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated july 18, 2012); 
Dominic Rushe et a!., Anwar al-Awlaki Death: US Keeps Role Under Wraps to Manage Yemen Fallout, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2011, 14:31 EDT), http://www.guardian.eo.uk/world/ 
2011/ sep/30/ an war -al-awlaki -yemen ?news feed= true. 
96. David S. Cloud, U.S.-born Cleric was Target of Yemen Drone Strike, L.A. TiMES (May 7, 
2011), http:/ /articles.latimes.com/2011/may/07 /world/la-fg-yemen-drones-20110507. 
97. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting that the 
Washington Post had reported in january 2010 that al-Aulaqi was on a U.S. "kill list"). 
98. !d. at 1. 
99. Rushe, supra note 95. 
100. Glenn Greenwald, The Killing of Awlaki's 16-Year-Old Son, SALON.COM (Oct. 20, 2011), 
http:/ /www.salon.com/20 11/1 0/20/the _killing_ of_ awlakis _16 _year_ old _son/single ton. 
101. Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES (March 5, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ 
reference/timestopics/people/ a/ an war_ a!_ awlaki/index.html ?in line= nyt -per. 
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Initially, the reaction in the U.S. was highly critical. 102 President 
Obama's targeted killing of al-Aulaqi, however, found some support 
in unlikely places. Former Wisconsin Senator Russ Feingold, a 
Democrat known as. a champion of civil liberties, said that he was 
"very pleased that [al-Aulaqi] was taken out." 103 Even Obama's one-
time campaign rival, Senator John McCain praised the operation. 104 
Since then, the Obama administration has tentatively attempted to 
publicly justify the targeted killing of U.S. citizens. An anonymous 
leaker gave parts of a memo from the Office of Legal Counsel that 
provided the legal justifications for targeting U.S. citizens to the 
New York Times in October 2011. 105 Then, in February, 2012, Jeh 
Johnson, general counsel for the Department of Defense, explained 
the policy during a speech at Yale University. 106 Johnson emphasized 
that the AUMF had no "geographical limitation" and defended 
targeted killings by pointing out that the U.S. lawfully targeted 
individuals during the Second World War as wel1. 107 
The most detail on the justification for targeting U.S. citizens 
came in March 2012 when Attorney General Eric Holder publicly 
addressed the issue at Northwestern University School of Law. 108 
Like Johnson, he emphasized that the current war is not limited 
geographically to Afghanistan or any other state. 109 He then 
described three elements necessary for a targeted killing of a U.S. 
102. See, e.g., GreC'nwald, supra note 7; Paul Craig Roberts, The Day America Died, 
LEWROCKWI:LL.COM (Oct. 3, 2011), http://lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts328.html; Michael 
Martinez, US. Drone Killing of American al-Awlaki Prompts Legal, Moral Debate, CNN (Sept. 30, 
2011 ), http:/ /articles.cnn.com/2011-09-30/politics/politics _targeting-us-citizens_l_al-awlaki-
yemeni-embassy-drone-missile? _s=PM:POLITICS. 
103. Andrea Stone, Russ Feingold 'Pleased' Anwar Al-1\.wlaki Was Taken Out By Drone Strike, 
HUHJNG1 ON POST (Feb. 22, 201 2), http:/ /www.huffingtonpost.com/20 1 2/02/22/russ-feingold-
anwar-al-awlaki_ n_1291593.html?ref =politics. 
I 04. Sara Sorcher, McCuin: Obama Does Not Need to Apologize for Awlaki Killing, NAT'L). (Oct. 
3, 201 I), http:/ /www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/mccain-obama-does-not-need-to-
apologize-for-awlaki-killing-201 11003. 
I 05. Savage, supra note 86. 
106. johnson, supra note 68. 
107. Id. 
108. josh Gerstein, Eric Holder: Targeted Killings Legal, Constitutional, POLITICO (Mar. 5, 
2012), http:/ /www.politico.com/news/stories/0312/73634.html. 
109. Greg McNeal, Attorney General Eric Holder's National Security Speech, FORBES 
(Mar. 5, 20 12), http:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/20 12/03/05/holder-national 
-security-speech-targeted-killing/ 4. 
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citizen in a foreign nation to be lawful: "First, the U.S. government 
has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the 
individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the 
United States; second, capture is not feasible; and third, the 
operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with 
applicable law of war principles."llo 
According to Holder, this would be enough to satisfy the 
necessary balance between the government's interest in prosecuting 
the War on Terror and an individual U.S. citizen's due process rights 
under the Fifth Amendment. 111 While it is possible that the 
Supreme Court could review Holder's formulation, the Court would 
most likely grant the executive branch significant deference. 112 
Furthermore, as Al-Aulaqi v. Obama shows, it is difficult to find a 
suitable plaintiff to challenge the executive's interpretation of the 
law on this subject. 113 It is therefore unlikely that a future president 
will face judicial review of his targeting policies, even if they are 
more aggressive than the policy described by Holder. 
The administration has been silent as to the targeting of U.S. 
citizens within the United States. 114 However, a review of Holder's 
three points shows that they contain no bar against application 
within the United States. In interpreting Holder's statements, it is 
important to bear in mind the context. Since the Obama 
administration apparently used Holder's three elements in targeting 
Anwar al-Aulaqi and his son, then the facts of those targeted killings 
should give insight into how this targeting framework applies in the 
real world. 115 For the purposes of this analysis, Holder's three points 
are broken down into four elements: (1) thorough and careful 
review, (2) imminent violence, (3) capture is not feasible, and ( 4) in 
accordance with the law of armed conflict. 
110. !d. 
111. Id. 
112. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2003). 
113. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2010) (pointing out that 
determining whether a person evading U.S. law enforcement can assert his own rights in federal 
court is problematic). 
114. Catherine Herridge, FBI director: Have to Check Whether Targeted Killing Rule is Outside US 
Only, FOXNEWS.COM (Mar. 7, 2012), http:/ /www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/03/07 /mueller-
have-to-check-with-holder-whether-targeted-killing-rule-is-outside-us. 
115. See Savage, supra note 86. 
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A. Thorough and Careful Review 
The first element for targeting a U.S. citizen has two main parts. 
The government must conduct a "thorough and careful review," and 
that review must conclude that the targeted person poses an 
"imminent threat of violent attack against the United States."116 The 
review process is apparently where the Obama administration is 
attempting to satisfy the requirements of due process. The vague 
nature of Holder's statement, however, raises questions about notice 
and independent judicial review. Al-Aulaqi had effective notice of his 
status as a targeted enemy combatant, but he did not have official 
notice. 117 Giving notice to a target would cause the U.S. military to 
lose a strategic advantage, but it may also encourage targeted 
individuals to disassociate themselves from al-Qaeda. These 
considerations, however, are not legal, but strategic and tactical and 
probably reside within an executive's discretion as Commander-in-
Chief.118 However, the Supreme Court in Hamdi found that for 
detention, a person must at least "receive notice of the factual basis 
for his classification." ng This assumes, however, that the 
government already has custody of an enemy combatant. 120 
Targeting assumes the opposite: that it is not feasible to detain the 
enemy combatant. 121 
Using the balancing test in Matthews, 122 failure to give notice to a 
potential target increases the chances of error, but may be 
outweighed by the government's interest in an effective and 
workable strategy during armed conflict. One significant error that 
could be greatly reduced with notice is mistaken identity. This has 
been a problem in the prosecution of the War on Terror, most 
notably with Khaled al-Masri, a German citizen who claims to have 
been captured and held by the United States because he supposedly 
!16. McNeal, supra note 109. 
117. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 11 (noting that the Washington Post had reported in 
january 2010 that ai-Aulaqi was on a U.S. "kill list"). 
118. See johnson, supra note 68 (referring to these things as "core functions of the 
Executive Branch"). 
119. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2003). 
120. See id. (Hamdi was seeking post-detention habeas corpus relief). 
121. See McNeal, supra note 109. 
122. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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had the same name as a targeted terrorist. 123 In the scenario 
described in this Comment, however, giving notice would be 
completely unworkable since it would give the targeted persons time 
to remotely detonate the chemical weapons. Therefore, while notice 
might be preferable under certain circumstances, it is probably not 
legally required. 
The next question of the review process is whether the 
executive's decision to target would be subject to an independent 
review by the judiciary. Again in Hamdi the Supreme Court ruled that 
detention of an enemy combatant required review by a "neutral 
decision maker.'d 24 If this is the minimum amount of process 
required for a detainee, it seems that it would also be a minimum 
requirement for a targeted person. The Obama administration, 
however, has rejected any judicial review of targeting decisions as 
"not appropriate.'' 125 
]eh Johnson, during his speech at Yale, argued that the "real-
time" nature of the decisions would make judicial review 
unworkable126 and made reference to the Al-Aulaqi case in which the 
federal district court ruled that courts could not possibly weigh these 
kinds of strategic decisions. 127 For years, however, special courts 
have been involved in national security decisions. 128 FISA courts, for 
instance, gram or deny warrants requested by the executive branch 
based on an ex parte showing that the target of the warrant is an 
agent of a foreign power and that the purpose of the surveillance is 
predominantly for foreign intelligence. 129 The judicial review process 
of FISA courts is generally secret in order to more appropriately deal 
with sensitive national security issues. 130 Using the Matthews 
balancing test, judicial review could significantly limit error in 
targeting decisions and would not appear to unduly burden the 
123. US Rejects German's Case Against CIA, SPIEGEL.DE (May 19, 2006), 
http:/ /www.spiegel.de/internationai/O, 1518,417071,00.html. 
124. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533. 
125. johnson, supra note 68. 
126. Id. 
127. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 47 (2010). 
128. See Ellen C. Yaroshefsky, The Slow Erosion of the Adversary System: Article III Courts, FISA, 
CIPA, and Ethical Dilemmas, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS]. 203, 219 (2006). 
129. Id. at 219-20. 
130. Id. at 221. 
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executive in its decisions, especially since it is already going through 
a careful review. However, while some form of judicial review does 
seem to be workable and even preferable, it is clear that the 
executive branch currently rejects this approachY 1 The AUMF 
specifically allows for the targeting of persons according to 
congressional and presidential war powers without any requirements 
for judicial review. 132 Unless an independent review is statutorily 
required by Congress, the current state of the law is that the 
executive's decisions to target a person, even a U.S. citizen, will go 
unquestioned externally. 
B. Imminent Violence 
Next, according to Holder, at the end of the thorough review, the 
government must conclude that the proposed targeted person poses 
an imminent threat of violence to the United States. 133 The concept 
of imminence is apparently quite broad here if it is supposed to apply 
to al-Aulaqi and his sixteen-year-old son. Al-Aulaqi had been 
targeted for over a year, showing that the Obama administration 
seems to interpret imminence as having a broad time frame. 134 
Furthermore, it is hard to comprehend how a sixteen-year-old boy in 
Yemen, like Abdurrahman al-Aulaqi, could pose an imminent threat 
of violence to the United States, and yet he was targeted and killed 
just like his father. 135 Such a result raises serious questions about 
just how thorough and careful the review process is. One possible 
explanation for the targeted killing of Abdulrahman is that the threat 
of imminent violence that he posed was assessed in relation to the 
ability to capture him, which is the next element. 
131. johnson, supra note 68. 
132. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
133. McNeal, supra note 109. 
134. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, II (2010) (noting that the Washington 
Post had reported in january 2010 that al-Aulaqi was on a U.S. "kill list"). 
135. Greenwald, supra note 100. The killing of Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi is particularly 
disturbing in light of Article III, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution. It declares the punishment 
for levying war against the United States is treason, but forbids a finding of treason to work 
"corruption of blood'' U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3. In other words, the government is forbidden to 
punish the children of traitors for the treasonous acts of their parents. 
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C. Capture is Not Feasible 
When Holder says that "capture is not feasible," 136 he probably 
does not mean that capture is not possible, but only that capture is 
not a good option based on a risk-benefit analysis. It would be hard 
to argue that the U.S. military could not actually capture al-Aulaqi, 
even in Yemen. It was possible, but it was perhaps too difficult and 
dangerous. This makes more sense when one considers the 
feasibility of capture in relation to the imminent violence element. 
For instance, if a person is going to be very difficult to capture, then 
there might be a lower bar for the requisite threat of imminent 
violence. On the other hand, if a person would be relatively easy to 
capture, then there might be an extremely high bar-perhaps an 
impossibly high bar-for the threat of imminent violence that would 
justify a targeted killing. The reverse is also true. If a target poses a 
sufficiently high threat of imminent violence, it might never be 
feasible to capture him first. In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, perhaps 
his capture was considered to be so risky that the requirement of 
imminent violence was decreased. Perhaps this also explains the 
targeting of his son. 
Capture on U.S. soil is certainly easier than it is in Yemen. So 
easy, in fact, that a potential target's presence within the United 
States might nearly eliminate any justification for a targeted killing. 
The threat of imminent violence, however, is greatly increased as 
well. In the scenario in this Comment, the enemy combatants cannot 
feasibly be captured since they could remotely detonate explosives at 
the first sign of any attempt. Furthermore, their presence in the 
United States, instead of increasing the feasibility of capture, has 
only increased the threat of imminent violence. Therefore, the 
capture-is-not-feasible element of Holder's formulation does not 
preclude a targeted killing within the United States. 
D. In Accordance with the Laws of Armed Conflict 
The last requirement for the targeted killing of a U.S. citizen is 
that it must be done in accordance with the laws of armed 
conflict. 137 In general, the laws of armed conflict require that the 
136. McNeal, supra note 109. 
137. McNeal, supra note 109. 
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military necessity of any use of force be balanced with the princtle 
of humanity, or the potential to cause unnecessary suffering. 13 If 
the target is a military necessity that will not result in unnecessary 
suffering, then the laws of armed conflict also require that the 
targeting be restricted in its implementation by (1) adhering to the 
principle of distinction, 139 (2) adhering to the principle of 
proportionality, 140 and (3) using only lawful weapons for their 
intended purpose. 141 
1. Distinction 
The principle of distinction demands that both parties to a 
conflict discriminate between civilians and combatants. 142 In 
general, military personnel of the opposing nation in an international 
armed conflict are considered combatants. 143 The question is more 
complicated, however, when dealing with a non-international armed 
conflict with a non-state actor, like the War on Terror against al-
Qaeda.144 Civilians, or persons who are not members of a state's 
military, can still be targeted, but only if they are directly 
participating in the hostilities or are part of an organized armed 
force. 145 Furthermore, members of organized armed forces, like al-
Qaeda, who are not identified by a uniform with recognizable 
insignia, may be targeted only if they have a "continuous combat 
function." 146 
138. ICRC, Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law, No. 293 (April 30, 1993), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng! 
resources/documents/misc/57jmrt.htm. 
139. ICRC, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48, Oune 
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/470-750061. 
140. Customary IHL: Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, ICRC, available at http://www 
.icrc.org! customary-ihl/ eng/ docs/v 1_ cha _ chapter4 _rule 14. 
141. Customary IHL: Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary 
Suffering, ICRC, available at http:/ /www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl _rul_rule70. 
142. Protocol I, supra note 139. 
143. Customary IHL: Rule 3. Definition of Combatants, ICRC, available at http://www. 
icrc.org/ customary-ihl/ eng/ docs/v 1_rul_rule3. 
144. See id. 
145. Protocol I, supra note 139, at art. 51. 
146. ICRC, interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 991, No. 872 part l, §II (Feh. 26, 2009) 
(prepared by Nils Melzer), available at http:/ /www.icrc.org/eng/assets/ files/other/irrc-872-
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Holder's criteria that a proposed target must pose an imminent 
threat of violence could be interpreted to mean that a proposed 
target is a member of an organized armed group of a non-state party 
to an armed conflict that has a continuous combat function. 147 
Furthermore, johnson argues that the AUMF is not open-ended, but 
is limited only to al-Qaeda and associated forces. 148 He defines 
"associated forces" as having two necessary characteristics: "(1) an 
organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al 
Qaeda, and (2) is a co-belligerent with al Qaeda in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners." 149 Generally applied, 
these considerations seem to adhere to the principle of distinction. 
2. Proportionality 
Next, the principle of proportionality demands that parties to an 
armed conflict limit their targeting to actions where the loss of 
civilian life and damage to property is not excessive in relation to the 
concrete military advantage that would be gained. 150 Here, the 
commander on the ground making the targeting decision has to 
quickly assess whether the collateral damage caused by an attack is 
proportionate in relation to the military value of the target. The 
higher value the target, the more collateral damage will be 
tolerated. 151 There is no hard and fast rule about proportionality, 
and any judgment on proportionality must take into account all the 
circumstances. 152 In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, six non-targeted 
people died during the attack, at least one of whom was also an 
American citizen. 153 Since no one has officially raised the issue of 
proportionality in this attack, it is impossible to say definitively 
reports-documents. pdf. 
147. See McNeal, supra note 109. 
148. Johnson, supra note 68. 
149. Id. 
150. See Customary IHL: Rule 70, supra note 140. 
151. Seeid. 
152. See id. 
153. Anwar al-Awlaki, N.Y. TIMES, http:/ /topics.nytirnes.com/top/reference/times 
topics/people/a/anwar_al_awlaki/index.html?inline=nyt-per (last updated July 18, 2012); 
Dominic Rushe et a!., Anwar al-Awlaki Death: US Keeps Role Under Wraps to Manage Yemen Fallout, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.guardian.eo.uk/world/2011/sep/30/anwar-al-
awlaki-yemen?newsfeed=true. 
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whether it violated the principle of proportionality or not. However, 
based on other drone attacks, this does not appear to be an excessive 
amount of casualties by U.S. military standards. 154 Therefore, it is 
possible that targeting a U.S. citizen with an armed drone attack may 
be done according to the law of proportionality. 
3. Lawful weapon 
Finally, it is necessary to consider if armed drones are lawful 
weapons. Armed drones seem to have become the weapons of choice 
in the War on Terror. 155 It is also important to note that while the 
scenario of armed drones in the United States may seem a long way 
off, the use of unarmed drones in the U.S. is rapidly increasing. The 
U.S. has already designated domestic drone bases, and the Federal 
Aviation Agency is working with testing standards and waivers for 
unarmed drones operating within the U.S. 156 
Despite the fact that there is no specific treaty outlawing the use 
of armed drones, 157 some have questioned their lawfulness and 
effectiveness. 158 Critics have highlighted state sovereignty issues as 
well as insufficient self-defense justifications for the U.S. drone 
operations overseas. 159 These legitimate criticisms, however, do not 
apply when considering the use of armed drones within U.S. 
territory and do not make the weapon itself unlawful. Harold Koh 
and jeh johnson have both argued that the relative advanced nature 
of any given weapons system is irrelevant as long as the decision to 
target the individual is lawful. 160 Some have even noted that, 
strangely, armed drones seem less controversial than older methods 
of targeted killing. For example, a former CIA lawyer, Vicki Divoll, 
told the New Yorker, "People are a lot more comfortable with a 
154. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. 
155. John Yoo, Dead Terrorists Answer No Questions, NAT'L REVIEW ONLINE (Apr. 26, 2011, 
2:25 PM), http:/ /www.nationalreview.com/ corner /265648/ dead -terrorists-answer -no-
questions-john-yoo. 
156. Kashmir Hill, Ten Fun Facts About Drones, FORBES (Feb. 9, 2012, 12:25 PM), 
http://www. forbes.com/ si tes/kashmirhill/20 12/02/09/1 0-fun-facts-about -drones/2/. 
157. See Customary IHL: Rule 70. Weapons of a Nature to Cause Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary 
Suffering, [NT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v2 _rul_rule70. 
158. See, e.g., Shah, supra note 10, at 125-26. 
159. Id. at 115-19. 
160. Anderson, supra note 12; Johnson, supra note 68. 
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[drone] strike that kills many people than with a throat-slitting that 
kills one.'d 61 Beyond being an advanced weapons system, however, 
armed drones raise legitimate questions of proportionality. 
By 2009, the Brookings Institute determined that American use 
of armed drones had resulted in about 600 civilian deaths 
worldwide-a ratio of about ten civilian deaths for every lawfully 
targeted person. 162 A more recent study focusing only on Pakistan 
found that U.S. drone strikes over a three-year period killed fourteen 
al-Qaeda leaders and 687 Pakistani civilians. 163 American analysts 
may argue that a ten-to-one ratio or even a fifty-to-one ratio is 
acceptable according to the principle of proportionality if the 
concrete military advantage is important enough. It is hard to 
imagine, however, that the same amount of civilian casualties would 
be acceptable within the United States. Is it acceptable to have one 
standard for proportionality overseas and a different standard for 
proportionality at home? Whatever the answer, it does not make the 
armed drone an unlawful weapon according to the laws of armed 
conflict, although it may provide some practical limitations on how 
armed drones are used. 
Considering distinction, proportionality, and the use of a lawful 
weapon, targeting a U.S. citizen within the United States could be 
done according to the laws of armed conflict. When the U.S. military 
targets a person, the commander on the ground goes through a 
standard methodology to ensure that the targeting complies with the 
laws of armed conflict principles discussed here. 164 Figure 1, below, 
is an example of what the targeting analysis for a U.S. citizen might 
look like. "DPH" indicates a civilian who is directly participating in 
the hostilities and "CCF" indicates a civilian who is part of an 
organized armed group and has a continuous combat function. 
161. jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www. 
newyorker .com/reporting/2009 /10/26/091 026fa _fact_ mayer#ixzz 1 o Vo07Kk 4. 
162. DanielL. Byman, Do Targeted Killings Work?, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION Quly 14, 2009), 
http:/ /www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0714 _targeted_ killings_ byman.aspx. 
163. Shah, supra note 10, at 126. 
164. See U.S. Army Field Manual 3-60, p. 1-4 (Nov. 26, 2010). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Applying this analysis to the scenario of this Comment, it 
appears that it would be legal to target a U.S. citizen on U.S. soil 
under a narrow set of circumstances. The President, with proper 
congressional authorization, can use military force according to the 
laws of armed conflict to target U.S. citizens who are actively 
engaged in hostilities against the United States, even if that use of 
military force occurs within the territory of the United States. 
Targeting a U.S. citizen, however, requires the President to balance 
national security concerns with an individual's right to due process 
under the Fifth Amendment. 165 Taking all this into account and 
using an analysis similar to that demonstrated in Figure 1, the 
scenario in this Comment is probably lawful. 
The first consideration is whether the potential targeted persons 
in the scenario are combatants or civilians. In this scenario, the 
targets are not members of a state's armed forces, so they are not 
combatants. 166 However, they are not simply civilians, either. No 
matter how narrowly one defines the terms, the targets are either 
directly participating in the hostilities or are members of an 
organized armed force with a continuous combat function because 
they are in the middle of a plot to attack the United States by 
remotely detonating chemical weapons around San Antonio. 167 
Next, there must a be a thorough review that takes into account 
all the evidence against the targets and balances the threat they pose 
against the possibility of error caused by reduced process. 168 In this 
scenario, the President has done such a review. The review must 
further find that the targets pose an imminent threat of violence and 
that their capture is not feasible. 169 In the scenario, the targets 
undoubtedly pose an imminent threat of violence. Furthermore, it 
would be completely infeasible to capture them without running the 
165. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 532-34 (2004). 
166. See Customary IHL: Rule 3. Definition of Combatants, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 
(2012), http:/ /www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v 1 _rul_ rule3. 
167. See ICRC, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law Part 1.11 (Feb. 26, 2009) (prepared by Nils Melzer), 
http:/ /www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-documents.pdf. 
168. McNPal, supra note 109; cf- Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
169. See McNeal, supra note 109. 
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risk that they will have enough time to remotely detonate the 
chemical weapons. 
An armed drone, the weapon proposed for the targeting of U.S. 
citizens in the scenario, is a lawful weapon, but one that tends to 
result in non-targeted civilian casualties. 170 Since there is a definite 
risk to civilians, it is necessary to consider if all feasible measures 
have been taken to reduce collateral damage. 171 In this scenario, it is 
difficult to imagine what kind of steps the U.S. military could take to 
mitigate the civilian casualties. Any attempt to evacuate the 
neighbors or cordon off the area where the targets live would give 
them enough warning to detonate their weapons. A conservative 
approach to the armed drone attack might result in a survivor who 
could then detonate the chemical weapons. 
Once the commander of the operation determines that he has 
taken all feasible measures for the attack, he must still consider the 
proportionality of the attack. In the scenario, the armed drone attack 
kills two targets and seventeen non-targeted civilians. Based on the 
seriousness of the threat of chemical weapons detonated in a highly 
populated area, the amount of civilian casualties in this scenario is 
probably proportional. If it is not, then it raises serious questions 
about the lawfulness of U.S. armed drone attacks overseas. Nothing 
in the laws of armed conflict indicates that proportionality should be 
calculated differently based on the civilians' nationalities. 172 
Based on this analysis, it would be legal for the U.S. military to 
use an armed drone to target and kill a U.S. citizen within the United 
States based on the laws of armed conflict and the authority granted 
under the AUMF. This conclusion runs contrary to the century-old 
American tradition of extraterritorial armed conflict, but it is in 
harmony with U.S. domestic law and international law. This also 
explains much of the controversy surrounding the 2012 NDAA. The 
NDAA hinted that war is something that could happen in the U.S. 
even though that directly conflicts with the popular American idea 
that war is something that happens overseas and to other people. 
170. See Byman, supra note 162. 
171. Customary IHL: Rule 22. Principle of Precautions against the Effects of Attacks, ICRC (2012), 
available at http:/ /www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl_rul_rule22. 
172. See Customary IHL: Rule 14. Proportionality in Attack, ICRC (20 12), available at 
http:/ /www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v I_ cha _ chapter4 _rule 14. 
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The conclusion that under certain circumstances the U.S. could use 
armed drones to kill U.S. citizens within the United States is a 
statement of lex lata, or the law as it currently stands. It is 
emphatically not an opinion about what the law should be. While 
the conclusion of this Comment is admittedly disturbing, hopefully 
it will be a starting point for a renewed discussion about the 
inherent value of human life and the responsibility of a state to 
provide security for its citizens. 
* Marshall Thompson 
* ]D candidate, April 2013, j. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. 
181 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
Targeting Analysis for a U.S. Citizen 
Nominated Target 
C. ·1· ~ ~c b IVl mn om atant 
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• Yes 
~ 
Lawful Weapon used for Intended Purpose 
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No -------- ------.___ ._ No Yes 
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2013 
t This chart is based off a chart created by Professor Eric Talbot jensen, Associate 
Professor of Law at Brigham Young University j. Reuben Clark Law School, for a forLhcoming 
textbook. 
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